Please consider upgrading your browser software or enabling style sheets CSS if you are able to do so. This page has been archived and is no longer updated. Find out more about page archiving. Ethics guide.
Understanding Movements in Modern Thought | Awards | LibraryThing
Virtue ethics. On this page Virtue ethics Page options Print this page. Virtue ethics Character-based ethics A right act is the action a virtuous person would do in the same circumstances. A good person is someone who lives virtuously - who possesses and lives the virtues.
- Cookies on the BBC website!
- Radio interface system planning for GSM/GPRS/UMTS.
- Virtue Ethics: Radical or Routine?.
- Field guide to internal medicine.
- Customer Reviews;
- Polymer Blends and Mixtures.
- Absent Fathers.
See also. Religion and Ethics home Religions. Solutions for dilemmatic cases do not involve conflicting principles or rules, but rather the exercise of virtues in judging situations and the choice of suitable means to the ends established in a way to ensure that the best decisions are made. Goldim JR. Rev Amrigs. Van Hooft S. Aquino T. Rachels J. Os elementos da filosofia da moral.
Barueri: Manole; Reich WT. Encyclopedia of bioethics. Nova York: MacMillan; Kant I. Rodrigues F. O que nos faz pensar. Mill JS. Londres: Longmans; Maclntyre A. After virtue: a study in moral theory. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame; De Aquino T. Anscombe GEM. Modern moral philosophy. Foot P. Virtues and vices and other essays in moral philosophy. Berkeley: University of California; Hursthouse R. Virtue ethics. In: Zalta EM, editor. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Carvalho HBA. Teresina: Edufpi; MacIntyre A.
Dependent rational animals: why human beings need the virtues. Chicago: Open Court; Dewey J. Teoria da vida moral. Abba G.
Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski
Gardiner P. A virtue ethics approach to moral dilemmas in medicine.
J Med Ethics. Pellegrino ED. Professionalism, profession and the virtues of the good physician.
Mt Sinai J Med. Oakley J. A virtue ethics approach. In: Kuhse H, Singer P, organizadores. A companion to bioethics. New Jersey: Wiley; DOI: Kon AA. The shared decision-making continuum. Two infants, same prognosis, different parental preferences. Whose justice? Which rationality? Nussbaum M. Upheavals of thought: the intelligence of emotions. New York: Cambridge University; Bioethics and caring. Sandel MJ. Marcelo Gerardin Poirot Land contributed to the argumentation and revised the article.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Services on Demand Journal. But mainstream VE largely neglects these questions. Anscombe's third thesis concerns her claim that consequentialism is the defining mark of Sidgwick and "every English academic moral philosopher since him".
- Understanding Virtue Ethics - Stan Van Hooft;
- About This Item;
- Understanding Virtue Ethics - ebigufuj.tk?
- Series: Understanding Movements in Modern Thought.
- Prokaryotic Systems Biology?
- Singular points of smooth mappings.
- Recommended For You.
- Intelligence in Services and Networks Paving the Way for an Open Service Market: 6th International Conference on Intelligence and Services in Networks, IS&N’99 Barcelona, Spain, April 27–29, 1999 Proceedings?
- Optimization: Algorithms and Consistent Approximations.
- Broken Agile: Stories from the Trenches?
- 3 editions of this work.
For Anscombe, then, the defining feature of consequentialism is its rejection of moral absolutes, in the sense of absolutely prohibited types of action. Thus one could be a non -consequentialist in the now standard terminology, but still count as a consequentialist for Anscombe -- e. Sanford considers Slote to be a clear consequentialist in Anscombe's sense And he claims that Hursthouse shows a "consequentialist tendency" 96; cf. For Sanford, the abandonment of moral absolutes is a disaster.
Moral absolutes are "at the heart of genuine moral education" and non-absolutism is "a new barbarism" Worst of all, "the consequentialism [Anscombe] so presciently exposed and sought to war against has come to be reshaped and reconfirmed by the very arsenal she sought to use against it, Aristotelianism" After laying out his complaints against mainstream VE, Sanford lays out ten features of Aristotle's ethics. Each of these is so important, Sanford claims, that significant departure from any of them is enough to disqualify a view from being Aristotelian in a sufficiently relevant sense.
The ten features are:. In laying out these features, Sanford emphasizes the various ways that mainstream virtue ethicists -- including "most neo-Aristotelians of the mainstream variety" -- ignore or depart from them. Thus he concludes that mainstream VE is, to a large extent, Aristotelian in name but not substance. For Sanford, this shows that the complaints against mainstream VE made in the earlier chapters do not apply to a truly Aristotelian ethics. Sanford recognizes that mainstream virtue ethicists have a ready reply to the accusation that they depart from Aristotle: So what? Surely as philosophers we are not interested in arguments from authority, so why should be care simply because our views don't line up with Aristotle's?
Sanford's response comes in the next three chapters, in which he sketches what he takes to be a truly Aristotelian ethics, and attempts to show that it offers the best answers to the questions about human nature and the purpose of human life mentioned above -- the "fundamental background questions of moral philosophy".
In chapter six, "Anthropology in Aristotelian Ethics", Sanford lays out the Aristotelian idea that the virtues are perfections of human nature. Chapter seven, "Teleology in Aristotelian Ethics", deals with virtue, happiness, and final ends. Chapter eight, "Natural Law in Aristotelian Ethics", focuses on practical reason and justice, and attempts to show the difference between natural law reasoning and modern contractarianism.
Throughout these chapters, Sanford draws on the work of MacIntyre. I agree with Sanford and many others in thinking that the category of "virtue ethics", while sometimes a useful tool for classification, often obscures deep and important differences among the thinkers to whom that label is applied.
Moreover, I agree with Sanford that Aristotelian ethics is different in important ways from much of what is described as "virtue ethics", and that the former is more promising and interesting than the latter. If someone simply equates "contemporary virtue ethics" and "Aristotelian ethics", then Sanford's book is a useful corrective.
However, I have some reservations. First, there are serious omissions. Of course, even when one aims to assess a large movement in philosophy, as Sanford does, one cannot be expected to consider every thinker or text relevant to that movement. Still, some omissions will be so serious that they undermine the success of the assessment, since the thing one aims to assess will not have been properly brought into view. To my mind, the omissions in Before Virtue are of this sort.
Most surprisingly, Sanford makes no mention of the work of Michael Thompson. This is odd, given that Thompson's work is important to both Foot and Hursthouse, whom Sanford discusses often. Moreover, in Life and Action , Thompson does precisely the thing that Sanford complains is not being done -- he attempts to given an account of foundational concepts in practical philosophy life, action, practice , and he does so in a way that is broadly Aristotelian and that draws explicitly on Anscombe.
To varying degrees, all of these thinkers can be classified as "Aristotelian", and some of them draw heavily on Anscombe. All of them have things to say about virtue.